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Abstract. Most current studies estimate the invulnerability of complex networks
using a qualitative method that analyzes the decay rate of network performance.
This method results in confusion over the invulnerability of various types of complex
networks. By normalizing network performance and defining a baseline, this paper
defines the invulnerability index as the integral of the normalized network performance
curve minus the baseline. This quantitative method seeks to measure network
invulnerability under both edge and node attacks and provides a definition on the
distinguishment of the robustness and fragility of networks. To demonstrate the
proposed method, three small-world networks were selected as test beds. The
simulation results indicate that the proposed invulnerability index can effectively
and accurately quantify network resilience and can deal with both the node and
edge attacks. The index can provide a valuable reference for determining network
invulnerability in future research.
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1. Introduction
Recently, the work of the pioneering scientists Albert et al. on network resilience
has attracted much attention [1]. Based on the work of Albert et al. , Holme et al.
subsequently extended the concepts of (node) degree and betweenness to edge degree
and edge betweenness, and explored the invulnerability of complex networks under edge
attacks [2]. Furthermore, Motter [3], Holme [4] and other researchers have investigated
the dynamic effects of complex networks under node and edge attacks. Song et al. have
also discussed the fragility of fractal networks [5]. The real-world networks, such as
metabolic networks [6], scientific cooperation networks [7], social networks [8, 9, 10],
and email networks [11] etc. have also been investigated [12]. However, in most of these
studies, network invulnerability was analyzed by qualitatively assessing the decay rate
of network performance [1, 4, 13].
Recent studies have shared new perspectives in understanding network resilience
with the quantitative way. Schneider et al. [14] defined a quantitative index – R index,
and used this index to validate a conclusion that the scale-free networks with an onion
structure are the most robust scale-free networks against malicious attacks, although
still fragile [15]. Later, Schneider et al. [16] extended the R index to deal with the edge
attacks. Notice that the node attacks can be transferred into the edge attacks, the index
values should be same or close when calculating the node attacks and the corresponding
edge attacks. However, the R index does not pay enough attention on this constraint.
The current paper tries to provide a quantitative method to be able to address both
node and edge attacks, and have close values when dealing with certain node attacks and
the corresponding edge attacks. Moreover, this method prefers to provide a definition on
a clear distinguishment to the robustness and fragility of networks. To meet these aims,
we first normalize the network performance using the normalized size of the removed
edges and define a baseline as a benchmark for distinguishing robustness and fragility of
the network under an attack. Second, to quantify the network invulnerability under an
attack strategy, i.e. , a sequence of attacks, we define the invulnerability index as the
integral of the normalized network performance curve minus the baseline. This method
can assure the approximated index values when dealing the equivalent node and edge
attacks.
To demonstrate the proposed invulnerability index, we explore the robustness of
small-world networks. Two small-world networks from the real world and one WS model
network [17] are tested under edge and node attacks. The simulation results demonstrate
that the proposed method is effective at quantifying network resilience under node and
edge attacks and at distinguishing network robustness and fragility.
2. The quantitative method
The proposed method aims to 1) address both node and edge attacks and 2)
provide a definition of the clear and quantitative demarcation between robustness and
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fragility. To achieve the first aim, the proposed method suggests normalizing the
network performance using the normalized size of the removed edges. Because node
attacks can be regarded as attacks on bundles of edges, this method is capable of
simultaneously addressing node and edge attacks with the constraint that the network
under certain node attacks and corresponding edge attacks will have approximated
values. To provide a clear and quantitative distinction between robustness and fragility
under an attack, this method defines a continuous curve — the baseline, and then defines
the invulnerability index as the integral of the normalized network performance curve
minus the baseline, then establishes a benchmark such that if the invulnerability index
of a network is greater than 0, then the network is robust; otherwise, the network is
fragile.
2.1. Normalized network performance
Previous studies have proposed many methods for measuring network performance
[11, 2]. In this paper, we use the size of the giant component of a given graph to
determine network performance after a set of edges has been removed. When dealing
with node attacks, the removal of nodes is regarded as the removal of bundles of edges.
For example, the removal of node A can actually be regarded as the removal of all edges
of node A.
Assume that an initial network has N nodes and E edges. After the removal of a set
of edges T , the size of the giant component is s˜(T ). The normalized network performance
with respect to the normalized size of the removed edges r can be expressed as equation
(1). In this equation, s(r) ∈ [0, 1], and r ∈ [0, 1].
s(r) =
s˜(T )
N
(1)
where
r =
|T |
E
(2)
Because the number of edges is an integer (i.e., is discrete), any function of the
normalized network performance is also discrete. To define a baseline and compute the
invulnerability index, the function of the normalized network performance should be
continuous. We use the most common method for creating this function: i.e., linking
adjacent discrete points one by one to form a network performance curve. This method
is helpful of the approximation of the index values between the node attacks and the
corresponding edge attacks.
However, one problem associated with node attacks should be mentioned. The
removal of a node is regarded as the removal of a bundle of edges. Because the sequence
in which the edges are removed is uncertain, the normalized network performance varies.
To simplify this problem, this paper suggests a method of interpolation.
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Assume that the network performances before and after node removal are si and sj,
respectively; Here, i and j are the number of the edges of the giant component. Thus,
the network performance after the removal of m edges is defined by equation (3).
sm = si +
m
j − i
(sj − si) (0 ≤ m ≤ j − i) (3)
Using this method of interpolation, the node attacks are generalized to edge attacks,
and the network performance under node attacks approximates the network performance
under edge attacks.
2.2. Definition of baseline
When a network is randomly or maliciously attacked, a coordinate is often
established to characterize the relationship between the attack and the network
performance (see Fig. 1). In Fig. 1, the horizontal axis represents the proportion
of edges removed under each attack, and the vertical axis represents the normalized
network performance. Each attack and the corresponding network performance is
plotted as a point. After a sequence of attacks, the relationship between the attacks
and the network performance is plotted as a discrete curve.
r
s(
r)
0 1
1
0.5
0.5
P
A
B
Figure 1. Measurement of network invulnerability. The vertical axis s(r) is the
normalized network performance, and the horizontal axis r represents the fraction of
removed edges. The continuous blue diagonal line is the baseline; the green dashed
curve is the discrete network performance curve, and P is a point on the discrete
curve. When calculating the invulnerability index, the discrete network performance
curve should be continuous. The discrete adjacent points A and B are continued as
curve AB. The shaded regions are the difference between the baseline and the network
performance curve. The area above the baseline minus the area below the baseline is
the value of the invulnerability index.
Most current methods define network invulnerability by considering the decay rate
of network performance. In this paper, we set a baseline so as to more easily recognize
the robustness or the fragility in attack graphs and to mark the critical point at which
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the fragility of a graph emerges. The baseline is shown as the blue diagonal curve in
Fig. 1 and evenly divides the area of the coordinates into two parts.
This baseline is an equilibrium between the removed edges and the lost nodes.
When a fraction, for example, 5%, of edges are removed, there are three results for the
lose of the nodes. (1) 5% nodes are removed; (2) less than 5% nodes are removed; (3)
more than 5% nodes are removed. For result (1), the relationship of the fraction of the
removed edges and the responding network performance is linear, we define it as the
baseline. As to result (2), the curve is plotted above the baseline, defined as robust, and
for result (3), the curve is below the baseline, defined as fragile.
Mathematically, the baseline can be formalized as equation (4).
f(r) = 1− r (4)
The baseline is used as a strict demarcation to distinguish the network robustness
from the fragility in the attack graph. When a point on the network performance curve
is above the baseline, the network is robust to a given attack; otherwise, it is fragile.
For example, point P in Fig. 1 is above the baseline under a given attack; therefore, the
network is robust to this attack. Correspondingly, when a sequence of points are above
the baseline, the network is robust to a given series of attacks. Otherwise, the network
is fragile.
However, when some points are above the baseline and some under the baseline, a
demarcation is needed. Moreover, a more accurate demarcation of the invulnerability of
the entire network is also required. Thus, this paper uses the integral of the normalized
network performance curve minus the baseline to quantify the network invulnerability.
2.3. The invulnerability index
Based on the normalized network performance curve and the baseline, this paper
defines the invulnerability index I as the integral of the normalized network performance
curve minus the baseline. When a certain fraction of edges (denoted as α) are removed,
the invulnerability index is denoted as Iα. Formally, Iα is defined as equation (5).
Iα =
∫ α
0
(s(r)− f(r)) dr =
∫ α
0
(s(r)− 1 + r) dr (5)
Equation (5) can be rewritten as equation (6).
Iα =
∫ α
0
s(r) dr + (
α2
2
− α) (6)
The key to solving equation (6) is calculating the integral
∫ α
0
s(r) dr of the
normalized network performance curve. In fact, here the integral
∫ α
0
s(r) dr is the area
bounded by the normalized network performance curve and the coordinate axes.
Because E is the number of edges, the discrete normalized network performance
function s(r) has E + 1 points { s0, s1, ..., sE}, including the initial graph without any
attacks. Therefore, the area Aα bounded by the normalized network performance curve
A quantitative method 6
and the coordinate axes satisfies equation (7) when a percentage α of the edges are
removed as follows:
Aα = (
s0 + s1
2
+
s1 + s2
2
+ ...+
se−1 + se
2
) ∗
1
E
(7)
where
e = ⌈α ∗ E⌉ (8)
Thus, equation (6) can be rewritten as equation.
Iα = Aα + (
α2
2
− α) (9)
Because the domain of the coordinates is [0, 1], so 0 ≤ Aα ≤ 1. Therefore,
Iα ∈ [−0.5, 0.5].
Thus, the invulnerability index can be quantified. In extreme cases, the network
performance curve may completely overlap the baseline, Iα = 0. When the area above
the baseline bounded by a fraction of points, α, is smaller than the area under the
baseline, Iα < 0, the network is fragile; otherwise, Iα > 0, and the network is robust.
With the same fraction of removed edges, a larger invulnerability index indicates a more
robust network.
In particular, when all of the edges are removed from a network, the invulnerability
index is represented by equation (10), and the index I1 is often used by researchers to
estimate network resilience.
I1 =
∫
1
0
(s(r)− 1 + r) dr (10)
When α = 1, we can calculate the invulnerability index using a simple method.
According to geometry, the area bounded by the baseline and the coordinate axes is
always a constant 1/2, therefore, I1 is the area bounded by the network performance
curve and the coordinate axes minus the constant 1/2, which is written as equation (11).
I1 = A1 −
1
2
(11)
where
A1 = (
s0 + s1
2
+
s1 + s2
2
+ ... +
sE−1 + sE
2
) ∗
1
E
(12)
Note that s0 = 1 and sE = 0; thus, equation (12) can be rewritten as equation (13).
A1 = (
E∑
i=0
si −
1
2
) ∗
1
E
(13)
The invulnerability index I1 only reflects the final status of the robustness or
fragility. Under many circumstances, we need to know the status of a network under
specific attacks. Therefore, this paper suggests defining a few commonly used network
invulnerability subindexes — I0.2, I0.5, I0.7 and I1.0, which correspond to the removal of
20%, 50%, 70% and 100% of the edges, respectively, under given attack strategies.
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3. Simulation experiments and results
To demonstrate the proposed method, we select three commonly used small-world
networks as test beds: the neural network of the worm Caenorhabditis elegans (C.
elegans), the power grid of the western United States (Powergrid) and the WS model
[17] network. The first two are real-world networks, and the WS model network is
derived from the model of Watts and Strogatz. According to the WS model, we let
1000 nodes to form a ring, and for each node, link it to 10 closest right neighbors; and
then let every link has a rewiring probability as p = 0.02 to change its destination node
to an arbitrary node. Any additional information of all networks is ignored except the
topology. Some properties of the tested networks are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Properties of tested networks. N is the number of nodes, E is the number
of edges, D is the average degree.
Network N E D
C. elegans 453 2040 8.94
Powergrid 4941 6594 2.66
WS model 1000 10000 20
There are numberless methods to attack a system represented by network.
Commonly, we concern the random failures of the systems and the malicious attacks.
Therefore, this paper use two classes of popular attack strategies [2]. The first class
is the random attack strategies or the random failures, i.e. , to remove the nodes or
the edges randomly from a tested network. The second class is the selective attack
strategies or the malicious attacks, i.e. , to remove the most important nodes or the
edges one by one. Based on different definitions on the importance of the nodes or the
edges, different selective attack strategies can be used [13, 18]. In most circumstances,
the importance used in the previous studies are the degree and the betweenness.
Moreover, the calculation method of the importance can also affect the selective attack
strategies, that is, we can only calculate the importance when before the attacks, termed
as “based on initial graphs”, or we can calculate the importance after every attack,
termed as “based on recalculation”. In general, the attack strategies widely used are
random, ID (Initial Degree), IB (Initial Betweenness), RD (Recalculation Degree), RB
(Recalculation Betweenness). Here we only choose the attack strategies based on the
initial graphs, i.e., ID and IB. That is, before removing any nodes or edges, the degree or
betweenness values are calculated and sorted in descending order, and then, the nodes
or edges will be removed one by one according to their orders, the most important
nodes or edges will be removed firstly. If some nodes or edges have the same degree or
betweenness, then they will be chosen one by one randomly.
The simulation results of the proposed method under random (Rn), ID and IB
attacks on edges and nodes are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively, and the
corresponding invulnerability indexes are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
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Figure 2. Simulation experiments under edge attacks. s(r) is the normalized network
performance, which is measured by the size of the giant component, and r is the
percentage of edges removed. The yellow (triangles) curves represent the Powergrid
network tested under corresponding random, ID and IB attacks; the red (rectangles)
curves represent the C. elegans network; the green (circles) curves represent the WS
model network; and the black line is the baseline. The D in ID indicates edge degree,
and B in IB indicates the edge betweenness.
3.1. Simulation experiments under edge attacks
In these experiments, three widely used attack strategies are used, that is, the
random, ID and IB edge attacks. Here, the degree of an edge [2] is the product of the
degrees of the linked nodes, and the betweenness of an edge [2] is defined as the number
of shortest paths between pairs of nodes that run along the edge.
The results of experiments on networks under random and selective attacks are
shown in Fig. 2, and the corresponding indexes are listed in Table 2.
Table 2. The invulnerability indexes of networks tested under edge attacks.
Network Strategy I0.2 I0.5 I0.7 I1.0
C. elegans Rn 0.018 0.120 0.206 0.286
— ID 0.008 0.070 0.120 0.166
— IB 0.008 0.070 0.138 0.166
Powergrid Rn 0.008 -0.152 -0.302 -0.390
— ID 0.000 -0.112 -0.188 -0.234
— IB -0.062 -0.240 -0.316 -0.358
WS model Rn 0.020 0.126 0.246 0.406
— ID 0.020 0.112 0.210 0.300
— IB 0.020 0.114 0.194 0.206
In Fig. 2(a), most points on the network performance curves for the C. elegans (the
red-rectangle curve) and the WS model network (the green-triangle curve) are clearly
located above the baseline under random attacks. In contrast, a large proportion of
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points on the network performance curve of the Powergrid network (the yellow-circle
curve) are below the baseline. Similarly, in Fig. 2(b) and (c), the relative locations
of the network performance curves and the baseline do not change much, yet the
network performance curves of the Powergrid (yellow-circle curve) deviate greatly from
the baseline as compared with that in Fig. 2(a). Based on the definition of the baseline,
we can determine that the C. elegans and WS model networks are robust and the
Powergrid network is fragile under the three types of attacks.
Regarding the quantified network invulnerability (Fig. 2), the corresponding
invulnerability indexes I0.2, I0.5 and I0.7 indicate changes in network invulnerability,
while the invulnerability index I1 is used to estimate network resilience. For the networks
tested under the random attack strategy, the four invulnerability indexes of the WS
model and C. elegans networks are positive and increase to 0.406 and 0.286, respectively.
By contrast, the Powergrid becomes fragile when over 50% edges are removed because
the network’s index becomes negative at I0.5, and I1, which is the smallest index value,
equals −0.234. From Fig. 2 and Table 2, we can see that the WS model network is the
most robust among those tested, and the Powergrid is the most fragile.
3.2. Simulation experiments under node attacks
The simulation results and the four corresponding invulnerability indexes are shown
in Fig. 3 and Table 3, respectively.
Similar to the edge attack strategy, the random attack strategy on nodes involves
removing nodes arbitrarily from the tested networks. In addition, selective attack
strategies aim to remove nodes in the descending order of node degree or node
betweenness based on the initial graphs. The degree of a node is the number of
connections that it has to other nodes, and the betweenness of a node is defined as
the number of shortest paths from all vertices to all others that pass through that node.
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Figure 3. Simulation experiments under node attacks. The degree and betweenness
are actually the node degree and the node betweenness, respectively.
The relative locations between the network performance curves and the baseline
in Fig. 3 are similar to those shown in Fig. 2, i.e., most of the points on the network
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Table 3. The invulnerability indexes of networks tested under node attacks.
Network Strategy I0.2 I0.5 I0.7 I1.0
C. elegans Rn 0.146 0.178 0.180 0.194
— ID 0.095 0.111 0.128 0.135
— IB 0.103 0.137 0.154 0.188
Powergrid Rn -0.005 -0.083 -0.115 -0.128
— ID 0.001 -0.094 -0.134 -0.156
— IB 0.116 -0.076 -0.156 -0.201
WS model Rn 0.143 0.159 0.193 0.207
— ID 0.119 0.141 0.189 0.267
— IB 0.108 0.130 0.170 0.265
performance curves of the WS model and C. elegans networks are above the baseline,
and almost all of the points on the network performance curve of the Powergrid are
below the baseline.
To be specific, under random attacks on the nodes (Fig. 3(a)), the network
invulnerability index of the C. elegans and WS model networks satisfy the condition
I1 > 0, and the invulnerability of the latter is slightly larger than that of the former.
The value of I1 for the Powergrid is negative and is clearly the smallest I1 value. From
Fig. 3 and Table 3, we can see that the WS model network is the most robust among
the tested networks under random attacks, and the Powergrid is the most fragile.
In addition, Fig. 3(b) and (c) have showed that the WS model network is the most
robust under ID and IB attacks, meanwhile, the Powergrid is the most fragile. From
Table 3, we can see that the invulnerability index of the Powergrid becomes negative
when α = 0.5. This result indicates that the network performance of the Powergrid
decreases more rapidly when over 50% of the network’s edges are removed.
To validate the approximation of the index values between the node attacks and
corresponding edge attacks, we transfer the ID and IB node attacks to the ID and IB
edge attacks, and compared the index values as Table 4. When transferring the node
attacks to the edge attacks, for each removing node, every edge would be randomly
chosen one by one to be removed. Because the sequence of the removing edges are
different, the invulnerability index values of edge attacks may vary. Therefore, there
are errors between the node attacks and the corresponding edge attacks. In Table 4, we
carry out the node attacks and corresponding edge attacks one time for each network,
and calculate the absolute errors of the invulnerability index values between under the
node attacks and under the corresponding edge attacks (denoted as Error).
From Table 4, we can see that the values are very close with the maximal absolute
error less than 0.09. The results demonstrated the proposed method can assure the
approximation.
From the simulation experiments discussed above, we can draw a few conclusions: 1)
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Table 4. The approximation analysis on the node attacks and corresponding edge
attacks.
Network SubIndex ID Node ID Edge Error IB Node IB Edge Error
C. elegans I0.2 0.095 0.016 -0.079 0.103 0.016 -0.087
— I0.5 0.111 0.102 -0.092 0.137 0.102 -0.036
— I0.7 0.128 0.193 0.065 0.154 0.193 0.039
— I1 0.135 0.211 0.076 0.188 0.223 0.035
Powergrid I0.2 0.000 0.019 0.002 -0.062 -0.036 0.026
— I0.5 -0.112 -0.081 0.031 -0.240 -0.193 0.047
— I0.7 -0.188 -0.157 0.031 -0.316 -0.269 0.047
— I1 -0.234 -0.201 0.033 -0.358 -0.313 0.045
WS I0.2 0.020 0.012 -0.077 0.020 0.012 -0.077
— I0.5 0.112 0.071 -0.041 0.114 0.071 -0.043
— I0.7 0.210 0.128 -0.082 0.194 0.129 -0.065
— I1 0.300 0.210 -0.090 0.206 0.212 0.055
The proposed method can simultaneously estimate network invulnerability under both
edge attacks and node attacks; 2) small-world networks can be robust under selective
attacks; 3) the robustness or fragility of a specific network is consistent under node
attacks and edge attacks.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an invulnerability index and demonstrated a calculation
method to quantify network robustness. Using small-world networks as test beds, the
effectiveness of the proposed index was evaluated. The experimental results indicated
that the proposed index could work under both node and edge attacks. Moreover, the
invulnerability index under node attacks approximates that under edge attacks. In
other words, the conclusions on the robustness or the fragility of the tested networks
were consistent. Moreover, the method provided an accurate demarcation by which to
distinguish the robustness from the fragility. When addressing the behavior of network
performance under a series of attacks, the method also provided the critical point at
which a network becomes fragile. The experimental results indicate that two of the
tested networks are robust to selective and random attacks, whereas the third is fragile:
i.e., some small-world networks could be robust to selective attacks.
In the future, we will use the method reported here to investigate the robustness
of other types of networks under different attack strategies such as PageRank [19, 20]
attacks and HITS [21] attacks.
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